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Is Public Space Suited to Co-operative Inquiry?
SOR-HOON TAN
ABSTRACT This article questions the nature of the philosophical commitment to the problem of ‘the
public’ in modernity. To what extent does the natural form of the public determine the use and value of
the instruments of pragmatism in the public–private divide. In this interpretation, John Dewey’s ideas
about ‘the public’ are presented in terms of how to solve a specic problem through what he sees as
‘co-operative inquiry’. The article also examines the role of public space in the process of democratization
through the potential of co-operative inquiry. More often than not, it appears that the politics of public
space may be both detrimental and/or benecial to its end-users in China, Europe, the Americas, Africa,
and the rest of Asia.
In his paper prepared for the ‘Modernity & Politics’ panel at the Modernist Studies
Association’s Annual Conference in 2001, Antonio L. Rappa argued that:
Public spaces are physical and temporal sites where the colonial imprint of
modernity appears to have made the most signi cant impression. The imprint
of modernity on the nature of public space is symbolized in tangible architec-
tural forms and gentri ed civic locations that register the con uence of colonial
and postcolonial periods.1
In 1989, the world was trans xed by the drama that unfolded in Tiananmen Square. To
some, the Goddess of Democracy statue that the student demonstrators erected was an
incongruous icon of Western imperialist in uence clashing with the hallowed traditions
of that most symbolic of all public spaces in that country, and perhaps for the Chinese
Diaspora all over the world as well. To others it was a beacon of hope which tragically
toppled in another failed struggle towards democracy.
Before any Westerner had heard of Tiananmen, the Square had been privy to, and
was the public site of, political tension and attention. There had been ‘people’s’
demonstrations and mass movements in that Square before 1989. But these are
overshadowed by the ‘demonstrations’ orchestrated by the authorities to display power.
The latter displays hark back to China’s imperial past, when the Gate of Heavenly Peace
separated the ruler from the ruled, concealed the ruler and preserved the mystic of his
power; ruler and ruled communicated only through rituals. In the twentieth century,
Tiananmen Square remains ‘a locus of coalescence for political expression, collective
memory, identity, and history … a prime visual means of political rhetoric in modern
China to address the public and actually to constitute the public itself’ (Wu Hung, 1991,
pp. 84–85).
For many, the 1989 democracy movement recalls, among other events, the May
Fourth movement and the student protests of 1919. John Dewey was a witness to that
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earlier struggle for democracy, arriving in China on 30 April 1919 for a visit that lasted
more than two years. Dewey was in uential among several leaders of the New Culture
movement—Hu Shih and Jiang Menglin were his students—and his lectures were so
popular that he could justi ably be said to have become a ‘fad’ in China during his visit
(Keenan, 1977, p. 34). What might Dewey have to say about the events that took place
in Tiananmen seven decades later? On a more modest scale, what does his philosophy
have to say about the role of public space in the pursuit and functioning of democracy?
The emergence and organization of publics play a key role in Dewey’s philosophy of
democracy. Central to that role is the process of a public’s co-operative inquiry
(Campbell, 1995, pp. 193–213).2 In this paper, I shall explore the democratic ef cacy of
public space as an arena of cooperative inquiry.
Democratic public space and public sphere
The words ‘public space’ conjure up an image of a place one can point to and be in—a
town square, a piazza, a park, the Athenian agora, or the Roman forum. It is a place open
to the public, to the people, to anybody and everybody. It is a place where people gather,
interact, or act, together or separately. Public space could be used for ‘private’ purposes,
where people are present as separate individuals, ignoring or merely tolerating the
presence of others, each enjoying or using the place privately. Even when there is
interaction, the purposes could remain private. Tourists and hawkers are common
examples of those using public space for private purposes. Only when the interaction
arises from or gives rise to interests or goals shared by all as a people, as a public, is the
public space also used for a public purpose.
How does public space become democratic? Unlike an authoritarian public space
where authorities impose the public ‘purpose’, a democratic public space is used for a
public purpose determined by the people acting freely and equally, bound together by
spontaneous ties that are both sentimental and practical. Its physical dimension gives a
powerful visibility to political struggles and action. The association of public spaces with
democracy is embodied in images of popular protests and demonstrations. The public
space  res modern imagination as the battleground where ordinary people without
institutionalized power mobilize and organize to change the status quo, to seize power
from those who refuse to share it or exercise it justly for the bene t of all.
In a democracy, it is a place where the people can be seen and heard, can exercise
their civil rights and participate in the public life beyond their periodic trips to the ballot
box.
Though the terms are sometimes used interchangeably, public space is only part of the
public sphere of modern political thought.3 Immanuel Kant focused our attention on the
public use of reason as the basis of the ethical commonwealth. The public sphere is the
‘organizational principle’ of the liberal constitutional state, wherein ‘laws empirically had
their origin in the “public agreement” of the public engaged in critical debate’. The
public sphere, as the ‘market place of ideas’, is central to a liberal democracy. As the
arena from which the uni ed ‘voice of the people’ (i.e. public opinion) emerges, it is
crucial for self-government. In the public sphere of Western modernity, citizens assemble
and unite freely, and express and publicize their opinions freely concerning objects
connected with the practice of the state (Habermas, 1989, p. 231). Free public discussion,
which de nes a public sphere, does not require a physical place; it could occur in
newspapers, radio, television, or the Internet.
However, Dewey argued that the emergence of democratic publics, articulate and
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organized, ‘is accomplished in face to face relationships by means of direct give and take’
(Dewey, 1954). If we understand this to mean that face-to-face interaction is required in
the free and open communication that sustains a democracy, then the public space must
be the most crucial form of the public sphere as a condition of democracy. I shall
proceed  rst on this limited premise, but I shall look beyond it and indicate some
direction for further inquiry in the concluding section.
The nature of co-operative inquiry
For Dewey, the de nitive activity of a democratic public is not the Enlightenment ‘use
of public reason’. Human beings are not essentially rational beings. Our thinking abilities
are not  xed and innate; they are developed over time in our interactions with our
natural and social environments (Dewey, 1983). Dewey referred to these abilities as
effective or embodied intelligence (Dewey, 1984, p. 366). Effective intelligence is the
result of inquiry that is social rather than individual; it is co-operative in the sense of
involving shared efforts to advance the common good. Co-operative inquiry is more than
an open exchange of individually formed opinions; its outcome is different from that of
the free competition of ideas in a liberal public sphere.
Embodied intelligence is not an individual possession; it is cumulated in social
processes over time, so that ‘a mechanic can discourse of ohms and amperes as Sir Isaac
Newton could not in his day. Many a man who has tinkered with radios can judge of
things which Faraday did not dream of’ (Dewey, 1984, p. 366). Intelligence results not
only from our shared historical cultural legacies, but also from the ongoing process of
interaction with others wherein there is free and open communication. What one single
individual lacks in intelligence or imagination can be compensated by others in a
co-operative inquiry, wherein sharing of views, constructive criticism, edifying discourse,
could lead to a more intelligent outcome than solitary thinking.
Dewey de nes inquiry as ‘the controlled or directed transformation of an indetermi-
nate situation into one that is so determinate in its constituent distinctions and relations
as to convert the elements of the original situation into a uni ed whole’ (Dewey, 1986,
p. 108). The situation that calls a public into existence, transactions having indirect
consequences serious enough to warrant systematic regulation, is a problematic one. It
is indeterminate, obscure, doubtful, disturbing, perplexing, full of con icting tenden-
cies—things do not hang together, and those involved become aware that ‘This won’t
do.’ When the trouble is recognized, and they get together to solve the problem,
co-operative inquiry begins. Publicity of inquiry allows those indirectly affected to
recognize their shared problem and interest. Those who might not be aware that they
were affected before would also be given an opportunity to know of their involvement.
Membership in any public must remain open at all times as more or fewer people might
become affected as an inquiry goes through the different stages of formulating the
problem, proposing and testing solutions.
Inquiry begins with examining the situation to formulate the problem. This involves
not only careful observation of what is going on, but also interpreting and selecting
factual materials on the basis of their assessed relevance to resolving the problem (Dewey,
1986, p. 112). Very frequently, conceptual reconstruction—especially of ends, values,
social doctrines, which guide social action—is required, for the ‘solution comes only by
getting away from the meaning of terms that is already  xed upon and coming to see
the conditions from another point of view, and hence in a fresh light’ (Dewey, 1976,
p. 273). Only when concepts and values used in inquiry interact freely with the
observable ‘facts of the case’, mutually modifying one another and thereby moving
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towards greater coherence, will the problem then be formulated so that it suggests
possible solutions.
Solutions are ‘working hypotheses’ to be tested intellectually before actual experiment-
ing. A solution that solves one problem sometimes creates other problems; a solution
must be evaluated in terms of its total effects (as much as could be anticipated). The
inquirers select the best alternative and test it in the actual situation. If it works, the
problem is solved, if not, the process of inquiry resumes with new information from the
experiment. Even if a solution worked, there could nevertheless be unanticipated effects
that could be problematic, and further inquiry would be required, perhaps involving a
more extensive or a new public (Dewey, 1976, p. 63).
Finding the phantom public
Dewey considered co-operative inquiry to be an effective antidote to the prejudice, bias,
misrepresentation and propaganda which all too often reduce ‘public opinion’ to what
Walter Lippmann called ‘the compounding of individual ignorance in masses of people’.
For Lippmann, ‘a public which directs the course of events’ in democratic politics is ‘a
mere phantom’. People are simply not rational or intelligent enough to govern them-
selves, with or without the liberal public sphere. Not only is government by the people
acting as a public impossible in the current state of affairs, it will never be possible—no
education, or information media, or public debate, would make it possible. This ‘false
ideal of democracy can lead only to disillusionment and to meddlesome tyranny’. Better
if we recognize that government is safest and best in the hands of an elite so that ‘each
of us may live free of the trampling and the roar of a bewildered herd’.
Dewey agreed with Lippmann that the public is in eclipse; but he disagreed with
Lippmann’s elitist conclusion. While Lippmann simply adopted the usual vague usage of
‘the public’, Dewey offered a more speci c understanding of the concept. The vagueness
of the term is what allows it to be manipulated for undemocratic purposes. Dewey
reconstructed the concept to recognize a multiplicity of distinct and overlapping publics.
According to Dewey, ‘when the consequences of an action are con ned, or are thought
to be con ned, mainly to the persons directly engaged in it, the transaction is a private
one’; when the consequences ‘affect others beyond those immediately concerned’ the
transaction becomes a public concern. A public is constituted by ‘all those who are
indirectly affected by a transaction to such an extent that it is deemed necessary to have
those consequences systematically cared for’. As there are in nite transactions that could
give rise to their own respective sets of ‘indirect consequences’, so there could be an
in nite number of publics.
Even though Dewey kept the usage of ‘the public’, it is more accurate to talk about
‘publics’ in his philosophy of democracy. According to Dewey, a public is organized into
a state by establishing special agencies to care for and regulate the indirect consequences
of transactions that require systematic regulation and therefore become public concerns.
‘A public articulated and operating through representative of cers is the state; there is no
state without a government, but also there is none without the public’ (Dewey, 1984,
p. 277). There could be some confusion over the way Dewey switched between ‘a public’
and ‘the public’. We might object that a single-concern public obviously cannot be
organized into a state as we understand the term. Though he appeared at times to be
proposing a new political theory of the state, Dewey explained that he used the terms
‘state’, ‘government’ and ‘of cials’ in a functional sense rather than to refer to the
political structures and entities that are so familiar to us that they leap to the eye when
these words are used (Dewey, 1984, p. 276n).
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We could link Dewey’s functional usage to the more common usage, and clear up
some of the confusion caused by Dewey himself, if we think of the public that is
organized into the political state as constituted by multiple publics overlapping and
forming a nested network which, when it is large enough, would be organized into the
kinds of relatively permanent structures we are familiar with at the various levels of
government. These public agencies and their of cers deal with numerous issues because
they are shared by a changing variety of publics with different concerns, but all of which
use these agencies to regulate the indirect consequences of transactions that affect
members of the various publics. New publics could create new regulatory structures at
local or national level, even international level. New publics could also use existing
structures to deal with new consequences that need systematic regulation.
Dewey’s concept of ‘a public’ identi es both what should be public concerns and who
should have a say in them. This is different from Habermas’s concept, for example,
wherein ‘citizens act as a public when they deal with matters of general interest’
(Habermas, 1989, p. 231)—the relation between any individual citizen and a particular
‘general interest’ remains vague, and how an interest is judged to be ‘general’ is left to
be resolved elsewhere. By considering states as organized publics, Dewey also offers us
a functional understanding of the democratic basis of political states. A state is
democratic when it effectively regulates the indirect consequences that are the concerns
of its constituent public(s). Since ends and means are inseparable in Dewey’s pragmatism,
effective regulation also requires a process that must itself be democratic. This is a
process involving the relevant public; it is a process of co-operative inquiry into indirect
consequences and how best to regulate them.
Dewey’s concept of ‘a public’ allows that each of us cannot ‘have opinions on all public
affairs’; nor need we do so. Not everyone has a right to a say in everything of ‘general
interest’. Each needs to have opinions, and should only have a decisive say on those issues
that affect him or her personally. Those not affected may offer views for consideration
in the inquiry—including the views of experts who might play an important part in such
inquiry—but they should not participate in the collective decision on which solution to
implement. Each of us is a member of numerous publics, and therefore should
participate in numerous co-operative inquiries. In a less than ideal world where the
different kinds of indirect consequences of transactions affecting one may exceed what
one could deal with, one prioritizes and participates most actively in those of greatest
concern to oneself. As different individuals would almost certainly have different sets of
priorities, there would be a ‘division of labour’ so that hopefully one would be adequately
represented by others who share one’s interest in inquiries in which one is not actively
participating. Since one is not a member of all the possible publics in a democracy, one
need not, as Lippmann argued, ‘know everything’ or ‘do everything’ (Lippmann, 1927,
p. 148).
Is public space suited to co-operative inquiry?
Co-operative inquiry requires freedom of thought and therefore of speech. To Dewey,
‘every new idea, every conception of things differing from that authorized by current
belief, must have its origin in an individual’. Since there is no knowing beforehand who
would have the new idea or new conception needed to solve a problem, to limit anyone’s
freedom to speak, to express their ideas, would also limit the chances of success of
co-operative inquiry. However, the freedom of thought and speech required for a
public’s co-operative inquiry is not the negative freedom familiar to the liberal.
In Dewey’s philosophy, ‘freedom from restriction, the negative side, is to be prized
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only as a means to a freedom which is power: power to frame purposes, to judge wisely,
to evaluate desires by consequences which will result from acting upon them; power to
select and order means to carry chosen ends into operation’. Having space is not enough.
‘No man and no mind was ever emancipated merely by being left alone. Removal of
formal limitations is’, according to Dewey, ‘but a negative condition; positive freedom is
not a state but an act which involves methods and instrumentalities for control of
conditions.’
We should not dismiss the importance of space, even when negatively and formalisti-
cally conceived. If co-operative inquiry is to be carried out by a public meeting face to
face, an appropriate place is necessary to accommodate it. The open and public nature
of the place, as well as the freedoms one exercises within it, must be protected. A private
place would not suf ce because publicity enables those with a common interest in
regulating the indirect consequences affecting them to recognize one another and come
together for an inquiry. Continued publicity throughout the inquiry ensures that those
who come to be affected by any indirect consequences from recommended and adopted
actions arising from the inquiry would also be given a say. In ensuring publicity, public
space is a contributor, rather than merely neutral, to the democratic process. However,
given the complex and extensive interdependence of today’s world, the publicity might
not be adequate if we rely only on face-to-face interactions.
Public space is necessary but not suf cient for democracy. Opportunity goes hand in
hand with risk. Large numbers of people gathered in a public space threaten public
order. Emotions can spread through a crowd very quickly, and the emotions of crowds
are prone to violence. A crowd can turn into a mob. The sense of sharing in a mighty
and irresistible power renders a mob reckless of consequences and encourages licence of
the worst sort. Too often we  nd that peaceful protests turn into riots. Even when people
share a common interest in some indirect consequences of transactions that require
systematic regulation, what is to ensure that such a Deweyan public would proceed as
an inquiring public rather than deteriorate into a mob? The characteristics enabling the
face-to-face communication of a public in inquiry will also provide opportunity for mob
behaviour.
Dewey did not subscribe to the dualism opposing emotion to reason, which has come
under some strong criticism; but he recognized that ‘nothing is so easy to fool as impulse
and no one is deceived so readily as a person under strong emotion’ (Dewey, 1983,
p. 175). Dewey’s philosophical psychology is built on three basic notions of impulse,
habit, and intelligence. Our impulses begin by being indeterminate and in nitely plastic;
they only gradually gain stable expression through the formation of habits. Emotion is
the outpouring of impulse as ‘a perturbation from clash or failure of habit’ (Dewey, 1983,
p. 54). It renders one vulnerable to manipulation (Dewey, 1983, p. 55). Re ection, ‘the
painful effort of disturbed habits to readjust themselves’ (Dewey, 1983, p. 54), steers us
away from that danger. Successful re ection is intelligence. The most important habit to
acquire is the habit of thinking before acting, a predisposition to inquire into a troubling
situation rather than reacting as dictated by haphazard circumstances. There is no
foolproof method to ensure that people would re ect rather than simply react or be
manipulated when in a group. The closest we could come to a safeguard lies in
cultivating the right habits, a topic that Dewey dealt with in ‘Democracy and education’
(Dewey, 1980).
Even when a public is not distracted by unruly emotions, co-operative inquiry could
encounter other obstacles. Public space is not empty. It is usually  lled with cultural and
historical meaning. The symbolic legacy of a particular public space could affect what
takes place there on any one occasion. Echoes of the past were prominent in the Beijing
Is Public Space Suited to Co-operative Inquiry? 29
student protests in 1989. The very language of their petitions to the authorities was
reminiscent not only of previous protests against the communist government, but also of
an even earlier tradition of remonstration by educated elites against the injustice of
imperial rulers. Cultural-historical semiotic context must be given a place in a public’s
co-operative inquiry; it plays a part both in the diagnosis of the problem and the
hypothesizing of solutions. While it could provide a common basis that shapes the
inquiry coherently, it could also complicate or even undermine the process when there
are multiple strands of historical-cultural meaning, some of which might be contradic-
tory, all of which are  ghting for dominance in the process.
The multiplicity of publics and their overlapping membership could also pose
problems for co-operative inquiry. It is dif cult, and in some cases perhaps even
impossible, to keep the different concerns separate. The co-operative inquiries of
different publics would overlap and affect one another in extremely complex ways. This
means that practically no co-operative inquiry will be quite as simple as our schematic
description. Every stage will be fraught with dif culties. All kinds of cross-currents could
sweep a public off course in its attempted exercise of effective intelligence. In the end,
co-operative inquiry in any public space might turn out to be as elusive as the public use
of reason in a liberal public sphere.
We cannot assume that the availability of public space will automatically lead to
publics engaging in co-operative inquiry. In some aspects, the nature of public space
could even obstruct such inquiry. However, this is not to declare it useless or
unimportant in the pursuit of democracy. Rather, understanding the problems of
co-operative inquiry in any public space should help us  nd ways of making better use
of public space.
Public space, ICTs and democracy
To talk solely in terms of face-to-face communication seems hopelessly inadequate in this
day of the World Wide Web and Internet. The printed media, telecommunications, and
the latest information and communication technologies (ICTs) overcome the limits of
physical distance. Thanks to such technology, the public sphere is more than public
space, and popular participation in politics is not limited to those who can actually gather
together in one place for face-to-face interaction. Technology has also transformed the
possibilities of political participation in other ways. Radio and television, for example,
being less limited by a literacy requirement than printed media, could provide more and
quicker access to information, as well as arenas for more vivid representation and
advocacy.
Craig Calhoun is not alone in thinking that the 1989 student protests in China
re ected ‘an emerging public sphere linked to popular culture in  lm, television and
other media’ (Des Forges and Wu, 1993; Calhoun, 1994, p. 2). Edward Gunn considers
the impact of 1988 television mini-series River Elegy (He Shang) one of the many
contributors to the events of 1989 (Gunn, 1993; Calhoun, 1994, p. 29). During the
protests, both local and foreign media brought the messages of the pro-democracy
movement to millions in China and the rest of the world. They sparked off similar
demonstrations in other Chinese cities and garnered sympathy and support for the
demonstrators even from people who have never set foot in China. A decade later, the
Falungong movement has also been staging protests in Tiananmen Square. It has received
less international media attention; but it has made extensive use of the Internet in
promoting its cause and publicizing the Chinese government’s actions against its
members.
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Technology, in extending the public sphere beyond public space, not only magni es
but also changes both the pros and cons of public space vis-a`-vis democracy. Does this
make Dewey’s emphasis on ‘local community’ quaintly nostalgic, even obsolete? Not
necessarily. His thinking could at least be extended to take account of these technologies.
Dewey himself did not ignore mediated communications even as he emphasized face-to
face interactions in The Public and its Problems. More important, his emphasis highlights the
need to inquire more deeply into the complex effects of technology on the nature of
communications and on the very nature of our experience. That ICTs, any more than
mass media and telecommunications, are not simple extensions of public space and
unequivocal blessings to democracy means that we need better understanding of what is
achievable when co-operative inquiry is conducted face to face, which might be lost in
mediated communications, and what such mediation makes possible which might
enhance the democratic ef cacy of co-operative inquiry. But that is a task for another
day.
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Notes
1. See A. L. Rappa, international conference paper prepared for the Modernist Studies Associ-
ation (MSA III) organized by Douglas Mao (Harvard University) and Michael Coyle (Colgate
University), Houston, Texas, 12–15 October 2001; see also Rappa (2001, 2002).
2. Dewey used the term ‘social inquiry’; but I think James Campbell’s ‘cooperative inquiry’ brings
out Dewey’s thinking better.
3. Habermas’s o¨ffenlichkeit, translated as ‘public sphere’ in English, is translated as ‘public space’
in France; see Robbins (1993, p. xvi).
